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This thesis investigates the compensation of senior executives directly below the 
CEO level. Specifically, it addresses two questions. First, the firm characteristics 
associated with the choice of individual versus group compensation schemes for senior 
executives (Chapter Two). Second, to provide evidence on the firm performance 
consequences associated with the choice of individual versus group compensation 
schemes for those executives (Chapter Three).  
Based on a sample of 303 listed Australian firms for the period 2003 to 2005 (590 
firm years), the key findings are: (I) individual compensation schemes are adopted by 
firms where individual senior executive inputs and outputs are separable and 
observable, and group compensation schemes are adopted where there are efficiencies 
from senior executive co-operation and interdependencies between executives; (II) on 
average there is no difference between the performance of these firms, regardless of 
their compensation scheme choice; (III) firms that choose compensation schemes not 
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